Dr. Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa and Dr. Alexander M. Rusero
On March 13, 2025, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) terminated the mandate of its mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC).
SADC had deployed the mission just over a year prior, on December 15, 2023, to assist the Congolese government in restoring peace and security in eastern DRC. This deployment followed an invitation from Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi under SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact, which allows for collective action when a member state is attacked.
Comprising troops from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania, SAMIDRC had an offensive counterinsurgency mandate to neutralize illegal armed groups and support the protection of civilians (POC), either unilaterally or jointly with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). SADC leaders intended for the mission to foster an environment favourable to diplomatic peace efforts.
Instead, the mission faced a litany of challenges that came to a head in December 2024 when the resurgent March 23 Movement (M23) launched a blitzkrieg-style offensive, capturing Goma and Bukavu, the two largest cities in eastern DRC.
Since January 26, 2025, over 843 people have been killed and more than 500,000 displaced, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation. The Congolese armed forces (FARDC) seem zombified, showing little resistance. SAMIDRC’s attempts to contend with the M23’s advance have also fallen short, with at least 19 troops paying the ultimate price and the rest confined to their bases under the watch of M23 fighters.
The deadly toll of the M23’s military escalation has presented an urgent call for international attention and support, including consideration of punitive measures against armed groups that attack civilians and peacekeepers.
It also forced SADC member states to make a choice: showcase their commitment to regional conflict management under the SADC Mutual Defence Pact by reinforcing SAMIDRC or withdraw the mission. Their choice for withdrawal reflected waning political support for the mission, particularly among the three troop-contributing countries (TCCs), as the operating environment turned more hostile and the mission failed to show results.
A Complex and Hostile Operating Environment
SAMIDRC’s operational challenges stemmed in part from the complex and hostile environment. Geographical barriers limit access to eastern DRC, and more than 100 armed groups reportedly operate in the region in a network of often shifting alliances.
The M23, now backed by advanced military technology, mainly from its patron, Rwanda, has transformed from a disorganized militia, previously defeated by the FARDC and the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) in 2013, into a formidable force executing well-coordinated attacks that have resulted in casualties among SAMIDRC peacekeepers.
This operating environment had caused some TCCs to question their involvement in the mission even before SADC’s recent decision. Malawi withdrew its troops from SAMIDRC in February in response to the M23’s ongoing military advance. While South Africa, the largest TCC, had recently deployed additional troops, it also faced growing domestic pressure to withdraw, especially after 14 South African peacekeepers were killed in the fighting.
Slow, Inadequate Mission Deployment and Insufficient Logistics
Even before the M23’s most recent advance, SAMIDRC had struggled to deliver on its mandate. SADC faced challenges in quickly deploying and sustaining the operation due to inadequate logistical support. A planned regional logistics depot is not expected to become fully operational until 2030.
This adversely affected SAMIDRC, resulting in difficulties in placing sufficient troops on the ground fast enough and fulfilling their operational needs. According to the Department of Defence of South Africa, a key TCC, the planned deployment of forces that was supposed to start on December 15, 2023, was delayed due to a lack of available aircraft. While SAMIDRC aimed to reach its full operational capability with a target strength of 5,000 troops by July 2024, only 1,300 had been deployed to eastern DRC by October 2024, far short of the estimated 6,000 M23 troops, supported by about 4,000 Rwandan forces.
In addition to being outmanned, SAMIDRC lacked critical air assets like transport and attack helicopters, as well as modern equipment like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), restricting its ability to conduct surveillance and provide close air support. Delays in receiving equipment from the African Union (AU) Continental Logistics Base in Cameroon due to AU and SADC strategic airlift constraints further complicated the operation. SADC requested UN support for SAMIDRC, but MONUSCO was only able to provide limited logistical and operational support under Resolution 2746 (2024).
Funding Challenges
SAMIDRC also faced funding challenges. The July 2023 SADC summit, which approved SAMIDRC’s mandate, highlighted the urgent need for sustainable financing for the regional bloc’s peace missions.
SAMIDRC’s annual costs were estimated at $500 million, with the DRC committing $200 million. The three TCCs significantly self-financed their deployments. For instance, South Africa budgeted $145.2 million for the deployment of its troops from December 2023 to December 2024. However, SAMIDRC faced a substantial funding gap that threatened its success.
SADC leaders noted that the regional body could not stabilize eastern DRC alone. Although the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), the principal body responsible for continental peace and security, facilitated a publicly unspecified allocation for SAMIDRC from the $7 million disbursement provided by the AU Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility in 2024, it still fell short of the mission’s required budget. SADC requests for additional UN support, including financial assistance for drones and strategic airlift, were largely unsuccessful.
SADC-AU-UN Collaboration
These funding challenges speak to broader issues related to collaboration between SADC, the AU, and the UN that were underscored by the experience of SAMIDRC. One issue was the nature of UN support for SAMIDRC.
In 2023, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2719, driven by its three African members (the A3—Ghana, Gabon, and Mozambique). This created a framework for the UN to partially fund AU-led missions on a case-by-case basis. However, this resolution only covers missions under the direct command and control of the AU. Therefore, while SAMIDRC was able to receive some support from MONUSCO outside of the framework of Resolution 2719, the level of support was fairly limited.
SAMIDRC also underscored broader challenges in the peacekeeping collaboration between the AU and its regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) under the African Standby Force (ASF) policy framework, including the conceptualization and implementation of the AU’s subsidiarity principle.
Although the PSC is designated as the main body for mandating peace operations on the continent, many peace operations have been initiated by RECs/RMs or voluntary coalitions of member states. The establishment of SAMIDRC aligned with the SADC Mutual Defence Pact but bypassed the PSC prior to deployment. While the PSC did ultimately endorse the mission, providing it vital political credibility and access to AU support, it only did so after the mission had already commenced, limiting essential consultations and coordinated planning.
Security Cooperation between SAMIDRC and FARDC
SAMIDRC also confronted challenges related to the deficiencies of the FARDC as an operating partner. SAMIDRC was authorized to operate jointly with the FARDC in the execution of its mandate, which turned out to be a double-edged sword. Major General Monwabisi Dyakopu, the mission’s force commander, emphasized that “SAMIDRC conducts joint operations and training with FARDC to ensure high efficiency and interoperability.”
Additionally, in 2023, the Congolese government significantly increased FARDC’s military budget to $794 million, a 105% rise from 2022, and procured Chinese UAVs to enhance intelligence-gathering capabilities.
However, the FARDC’s operational weaknesses have persisted, highlighted by its recent loss of significant territory to the M23 group. Moreover, SAMIDRC faced challenges implementing its POC mandate while collaborating with a Congolese army whose undisciplined members have perpetrated violence against civilians and that is aligned with the Wazalendo militia, also known for abuses against civilians.
The UN Security Council has also condemned FARDC’s support for armed groups like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu group implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsis. The FDLR seeks to overthrow the Rwandan government, which in turn supports M23 in its efforts to defeat the FDLR, complicating the security landscape.
Furthermore, with many armed groups active in eastern DRC, FARDC-SAMIDRC operations focused on neutralizing the M23 risked exacerbating the existing security vacuum, potentially empowering other armed groups to target civilians.
Looking Ahead
Based on the SAMIDRC experience, several steps are necessary to ensure that future SADC missions are successful and enhance the regional bloc’s capability to fulfill its mutual defence mandate.
SADC’s technical experts should conduct thorough reconnaissance before deploying a mission to develop a concept of operations that is suitable for complex and hostile conflict zones. This concept of operations should allow the mission to be flexible and versatile while ensuring the regional bloc does not overextend itself.
In addition, SADC should strategically link its missions to a political process that addresses the underlying causes of conflict and maintain strong operational and practical cooperation with the host government.
SADC should also deploy missions with sufficient resources to implement their mandates effectively. This includes sending troops equipped with essential military capabilities and the ability to execute priority tasks rather than remaining passive targets. Relatedly, SADC member states must be prepared to contribute to the costs of future missions through a proportionate assessment system for internal contributions.
It is vital for SADC to prioritize consultations and effective coordination with the AU on mandating, strategic planning, and resourcing. This coordination is also important for securing comprehensive UN support under Resolution 2719, which may include essential logistical and administrative support from the UN Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda. This enhanced continental and international support for SADC missions would strengthen the strategic peacekeeping partnership among SADC, the AU, and the UN.
* Dr. Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa is a senior faculty member of Africa University and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation (IPATC), University of Johannesburg and Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), South Africa.
** Dr. Alexander M. Rusero is the Head of the Department of International Relations & Diplomacy at Africa University, Mutare, Zimbabwe, and a Research Fellow at Africa Centre for Inclusive Health Management, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
*** This article was originally published on https://theglobalobservatory.org/
*** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.